Why has antitrust legislation not lived up to its promise of promoting free-market competition and protecting consumers? Assessing 100 years of antitrust policy in the United States, this book shows that while the antitrust laws claim to serve the public good, they are as vulnerable to the influence of special interest groups as are agricultural, welfare, or health care policies. Presenting classic studies and new empirical research, the authors explain how antitrust caters to self-serving business interests at the expense of the consumer.
The contributors are Peter Asch, George Bittlingmayer, Donald J. Boudreaux, Malcolm B. Coate, Louis De Alessi, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, B. Epsen Eckbo, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Roger L. Faith, Richard S. Higgins, William E. Kovacic, Donald R. Leavens, William F. Long, Fred S. McChesney, Mike McDonald, Stephen Parker, Richard A. Posner, Paul H. Rubin, Richard Schramm, Joseph J. Seneca, William F. Shughart II, Jon Silverman, George J. Stigler, Robert D. Tollison, Charlie M. Weir, Peggy Wier, and Bruce Yandle.
1: Introduction and Overview
Fred S. McChesney, William F. Shughart II.
2: Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy
William F. Shughart II
Pt. 1: In Search of the Public-Interest Model of Antitrust
Fred S. McChesney
3: What Do Economists Think about Antitrust?: A Random Walk down
Paul H. Rubin
4: The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws (1966)
George J. Stigler
5: A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement (1970)
Richard A. Posner
6: The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity (1973)
William F. Long, Richard Schramm, Robert D. Tollison.
7: Is Collusion Profitable? (1976)
Peter Asch, Joseph J. Seneca.
Pt. 2: The Positive Economics of Antitrust Enforcement
8: Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave? (1985)
9: Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Als